The Prudential Regulation Authority, the Financial Conduct Authority, and the Bank of England are jointly issuing guidance focused on preparing firms for the cyber risks posed by quantum computing. While a computer capable of breaking current encryption standards does not yet exist, the regulators emphasize that managing these future threats requires more than simply “adopting new cryptographic algorithms.” Effective preparation, they state, involves identifying cryptographic dependencies and vulnerabilities across entire technology systems, not just swapping out technology. These “effective practices” are not formal expectations at this time, but signal a unified and proactive approach to a growing threat within the financial sector.
PRA, FCA, and Bank of England Highlight Quantum Cyber Risk Practices
This proactive step acknowledges that robust cyber resilience against future quantum-enabled attacks extends beyond simply swapping current encryption for post-quantum cryptography (PQC). Firms must also account for the evolving nature of the technology itself, and how that impacts their overall risk profile. This allows firms flexibility in implementation, adopting the practices in a manner appropriate to their size, complexity and risk profile, Bank of England says.
The regulators emphasize that the existing supervisory statements and final guidance on cyber risk and resilience management still apply, regardless of the technology firms choose to employ. A sufficiently capable quantum computer, the regulators note, would be able to solve certain mathematical problems that are currently intractable for classical computers. This capability poses a significant risk to current cryptographic systems, necessitating a broader assessment of cyber resilience than simply migrating to PQC.
The regulators’ collective stance, articulated in the new publication, highlights the importance of keeping boards and senior management informed about developments in quantum technology, cryptography and the readiness of third-party vendors. Migration to PQC is not a one-time fix. It requires ongoing remedial work without compromising operational resilience. The regulators stress the need to retain the flexibility to respond as threats and standards evolve, indicating a long-term commitment to adapting to the quantum computing landscape.
Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computers (CRQC) Threat to Cryptography
A 2025 survey of quantum computing experts indicates a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) is likely to be developed within the next 15 years, with a notable probability of emergence within the next decade according to a report by Global Risk Institute and Evolution Inc. This timeline is driving a proactive stance among financial regulators, who are now urging firms to assess their exposure to quantum-enabled cyber threats even though no such computers currently exist, according to Bank of England. The impetus stems from the considerable time required to transition to post-quantum cryptography (PQC), cryptographic methods designed to resist attacks from both conventional and quantum computers.
Regulators acknowledge that delaying preparation increases the risk of prolonged vulnerability as quantum technology advances and the threat materializes, and also highlights the potential for malicious actors to employ a “harvest now, decrypt later” strategy.
This tactic involves collecting encrypted data with the intention of decrypting it once sufficiently powerful quantum computers become available. Firms are therefore being encouraged to integrate quantum readiness into their strategic planning, risk management frameworks, and investment decisions, extending beyond simply implementing new cryptographic algorithms. The regulators’ guidance, currently under consultation via CP17/26, emphasizes that effective cyber resilience requires a thorough approach to understanding and managing these evolving risks.
This includes awareness of the evolving threat landscape and the potential impact on their operations, communications and assets. A comprehensive plan should identify systems and assets that may not support quantum-resistant cryptography, including legacy applications, hardware and operational technology, and outline strategies for upgrading, replacing, or retiring vulnerable components.
The regulators note that firms can reference guidance on migration timelines published by the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and the regulatory bodies themselves, acknowledging that these timelines may shift as the technology matures. The regulators’ emphasis on proactive assessment and preparedness is not yet a formal expectation, but rather a signal of a unified and serious approach to a future threat. The Global Risk Institute’s Quantum Threat Timeline Report 2025, published in March 2026, provides further detail on the projected development of CRQCs and the associated risks.
Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) Migration Timelines and “Harvest Now” Risks
Firms face escalating exposure if they delay assessing vulnerabilities to quantum computing, as threat actors may already be collecting encrypted data for future decryption, a tactic known as “harvest now, decrypt later”. The potential for prolonged vulnerability increases with each passing year, prompting regulators to emphasize proactive preparation even before fully quantum-resistant cryptography is available. A firm’s board and senior management must set a strategic direction for migration, agreeing to a documented plan with clear milestones and dates to address the complex, multi-year undertaking.
It demands a detailed inventory of all relevant assets and dependencies, allowing firms to assess risks and plan accordingly. This inventory should extend beyond internal systems to encompass third-party providers of cryptographic functionality, products and services, evaluating their readiness to support post-quantum cryptography and the compatibility of their timelines.
Assessing dependencies on these external entities is important, as differences in capabilities and approaches can significantly affect a firm’s own migration and overall risk profile. Determining the extent to which current methods are vulnerable to quantum computing is a key analytical step, with implications for data confidentiality, authentication and the integrity of digitally signed information. Firms must also identify data susceptible to “harvest now, decrypt later” attacks, considering the sensitivity of the information, its potential value to attackers and the duration for which confidentiality is required.
A robust plan will also evaluate the firm’s ability to contain the impact of a quantum-enabled attack and recover affected services within acceptable tolerances. “Maintaining an accurate and up-to-date inventory of these methods, assets and dependencies (a ‘cryptographic inventory’) can help the firm assess risks and plan its migration to PQC,” the regulators state.
Board Oversight of Quantum Readiness and Strategic Direction
Boards and senior management must actively shape the strategic direction of quantum computing preparedness, according to recently released guidance. Firms are advised to concurrently assess the financial and non-financial resources, including specialized expertise and sustained investment, required to execute this plan over its entire expected duration.
Effective board oversight extends beyond simply approving a migration plan. This continuous education should extend to key staff, encompassing not only the board and senior management but also senior technical personnel and control functions, ensuring a firm-wide understanding of emerging quantum-related cyber risks. Providing boards with clear, accurate, and timely management information is also vital for effective oversight.
This information should detail progress on developing a comprehensive cryptographic inventory, a detailed record of cryptographic methods, assets, and dependencies, and highlight the identification of priority systems and services. Reports should address third-party readiness and demonstrate how quantum-related risks align with the firm’s overall risk appetite. Assessment of third-party dependencies providing cryptographic functionality is also essential, including verifying their support for post-quantum cryptography and compatibility of migration timelines. The regulators highlight that effective cyber resilience transcends merely adopting new cryptographic algorithms.
Cryptographic Inventory for ICT Estate and Third-Party Dependencies
A detailed inventory of cryptographic assets and dependencies is now considered essential preparation for the quantum computing era, according to recently released guidance. Firms are expected to map not only internal systems but also the cryptographic functions provided by external suppliers, service providers and connected organisations, extending the scope of traditional cybersecurity assessments. This broadened view acknowledges that vulnerabilities within the wider ICT ecosystem can introduce risks beyond a firm’s direct control, necessitating a comprehensive understanding of the entire chain.
Effective board oversight relies on timely and accurate management information detailing quantum readiness, including progress on building this cryptographic inventory. This granular approach moves beyond simply identifying vulnerable methods to quantifying the potential impact of a breach. This assessment should encompass cryptography used in application programming interfaces, public key infrastructure, authentication mechanisms and even operational technology.
Beyond technical assessments, firms are encouraged to consider constraints imposed by legacy systems when prioritising vulnerabilities for remediation. The sensitivity and required protection lifetime of data, alongside the criticality of systems and services, should all factor into the decision-making process. A well-prioritised migration plan, covering applications, infrastructure, networks, hardware, data and third-party dependencies, is seen as an adaptable, risk-based approach to managing the evolving threat.
This inventory is not a one-time exercise, however. Effective practice involves continuously updating the assessment of quantum-related risk, monitoring technological developments and adjusting strategy and controls as needed. Management of quantum-related cyber risk is an ongoing activity, requiring sustained attention and adaptation to a rapidly evolving landscape.




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