IOSCO urges financial authorities to shift from quantum analysis to action

The escalating quantum threat has moved beyond analysis and into direct calls for action, according to a November report from IOSCO, the International Organization of Securities Commissions. Between May and November 2026, four institutional publications dedicated to the financial sector addressed the quantum threat. The IOSCO report specifically targets executive management and boards of directors, concluding that this culmination of warnings from central banks, cybersecurity agencies, and financial supervisors emphasises the urgency of transitioning to post-quantum cryptography.

G7 Reports Shift from Quantum Analysis to Urgent Action

This escalation in published material demonstrates a clear transition from cautious analysis to explicit calls for immediate action to mitigate potential risks. The shift is particularly evident in the evolving recommendations from G7 affiliated organizations and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO).

Quantum Risk Is Now a Board Issue
Quantum Risk Is Now a Board Issue — Source: cryptonext-security.com

The G7 Cybersecurity Working Group, in a September 2026 report co-authored with ANSSI, broadened the scope of the quantum threat beyond traditional critical infrastructure concerns, explicitly urging organizations to initiate a transition to post-quantum cryptography “as soon as possible.” This document, produced with contributions from cybersecurity agencies across Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States, alongside the European Commission and ENISA, frames the threat as imminent rather than distant. This represents a departure from earlier assessments that focused on analytical efforts and timeline projections, instead prioritizing proactive preparation across all sectors.

IOSCO’s November 2026 report, “Implications of Quantum Computing on Financial Markets,” further solidified this shift, concluding that neither authorities nor market participants should delay preparation until a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) emerges. The findings highlight vulnerabilities in areas like long-dated syndicated loans, M&A data rooms and health data processed by insurers, all of which could be compromised by future quantum attacks. Post-quantum cryptography is presented as the primary mitigation strategy, due to its compatibility with existing infrastructure and alignment with standards published by NIST.

While quantum key distribution (QKD) and distributed symmetric key exchange (DSKE) architectures are acknowledged as complementary options for highly sensitive channels, the focus remains on readily deployable solutions. For European financial entities, these recommendations align with existing regulations, as the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA) already mandates the adoption of cryptography against emerging threats.

The European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) also note that the NIS Cooperation Group has recommended a post-quantum cryptography migration strategy by the end of 2026. “Preparing for Quantum Technologies: Key Considerations for Financial Sector Participants,” published in May 2026 by the G7 Central Bank Quantum Technologies Working Group, initially adopted a more analytical stance, pointing to a “non-negligible” probability of a CRQC emerging within the decade.

However, the subsequent reports from the G7 Cybersecurity Working Group and IOSCO demonstrate a clear acceleration in the perceived urgency, culminating in a call for proactive measures rather than continued analysis. The authorities recommend that institutions continue to plan and prepare for the risks arising from the rapid development of both AI and quantum computing, acknowledging the interconnected nature of these emerging technologies and their potential impact on the financial system.

“Harvest Now, Decrypt Later” Drives Common PQC Approach

The recommended transition process begins with a comprehensive inventory of cryptographic use and dependencies, followed by risk-based prioritization and the development of “crypto-agility,” the ability to replace algorithms without overhauling entire systems. Reliance on technology and service providers, which embed a significant portion of current cryptography, is repeatedly cited as a major challenge, with one estimate suggesting a $7.1 billion cost for migrating prioritized systems between 2025 and 2035.

Hybrid Signatures for Certificates
Hybrid Signatures for Certificates — Source: cryptonext-security.com

Beyond this common ground, the November IOSCO report introduces three key ideas that refine the discussion. The report asserts that even simple access to a quantum computer, likely through specialized cloud providers, is sufficient for a successful attack, broadening the threat model beyond nation-state actors to encompass anyone with access to quantum computing resources.

This interpretation, coupled with observations from the G7 central banks regarding the increasing availability of quantum computing via cloud platforms, suggests a need to consider who controls access and how widely it is distributed. IOSCO urges institutions to prepare for a potential “cryptographic zero-day” vulnerability, acknowledging that advances in artificial intelligence could accelerate the detection and exploitation of previously unknown weaknesses, leaving little time for a planned transition.

The European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) reached a similar conclusion, noting that frontier AI models could identify and exploit vulnerabilities at a rapid speed. The report also reframes the timeline for action, suggesting that expressing the deadline in terms of board meetings or quarterly cycles, units already familiar to decision-makers, is more effective than abstract “Q-Day” predictions.

This approach directly addresses the issue of “quantum procrastination,” where organizations recognize the need to prepare but delay action while awaiting clearer regulatory signals or more mature technology. Participants in IOSCO’s roundtables emphasized that preparedness requires a thorough approach encompassing procurement, third-party relationships, business continuity, legal commitments and overall strategy. The G7 Cybersecurity Working Group echoes this sentiment, framing the quantum threat as an economic and business risk extending beyond its cryptographic dimensions.

IOSCO also highlights the risk where the financial system relies on a limited set of cryptographic assumptions, creating common points of failure that are difficult to detect and remediate. This concentration manifests in shared certificate hierarchies, cryptographic libraries and hardware security modules (HSMs), increasing systemic risk. The report emphasizes that a successful post-quantum migration requires not only individual institutional resilience but also ecosystem-wide diversification.

Finally, IOSCO describes the transition as a three-phase process: strengthening cryptographic foundations, deploying PQC for priority use cases and an often-overlooked cleanup phase involving the removal of vulnerable algorithms and systems, and continuous monitoring of cryptographic dependencies through tools like cryptographic bills of materials (CBOMs) and software bills of materials (SBOMs). “Preparing for the Post-Quantum Era: A Call to Action” emphasises the need for a proactive, multi-faceted approach to mitigate the evolving quantum threat.

IOSCO Highlights Access & Zero-Day Threat Vectors

The escalating concern surrounding quantum computing’s impact on financial stability is no longer confined to theoretical analysis, but is now driving a call for immediate action from international regulators. The report notes that simple access will be enough for an attacker, a statement gaining weight as major technology companies increasingly offer quantum computing via cloud platforms. IOSCO’s analysis extends beyond the traditional focus on the development of a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC), asserting that preparation should not wait for such a machine to emerge.

IOSCO urges financial authorities to shift from quantum analysis to action
Source: cryptonext-security.com

This conclusion stems from discussions held during roundtables in Tokyo, New York, Zurich and Mumbai, as well as a comprehensive review of existing literature. The organization also highlights the potential for a “cryptographic zero-day”, a vulnerability exploited with little to no warning, and warns that advances in artificial intelligence could dramatically reduce the time available to detect and respond to sophisticated attacks.

A key concern raised by IOSCO is the issue of “hyper-concentration” within the financial system’s cryptographic infrastructure. This concentration means that a single compromised component could have cascading effects across multiple business services, even within institutions that have otherwise completed their post-quantum migration. The report’s findings suggest a fundamental shift in how financial authorities are approaching the quantum threat, moving beyond analysis and towards a demand for concrete, immediate steps.

Concentrated Crypto-Assumptions Create Systemic Vulnerabilities

This concentration extends beyond the technology itself, encompassing reliance on a limited number of service providers whose products embed a substantial portion of the cryptography currently in use. Approximately 80% of banks identify their dependence on information and communications technology service providers as their biggest challenge, as highlighted in a survey cited within the report. The systemic risk arises from the interconnectedness of financial institutions, where a single compromised component could cascade across multiple businesses.

IOSCO urges financial authorities to shift from quantum analysis to action
Source: cryptonext-security.com

IOSCO details how the same certificate hierarchy, cryptographic library, or hardware security module can underpin several distinct business services, creating a single point of weakness. One interpretation, IOSCO notes, is that the threat model must account for access to quantum computing itself, not just the ability to build such a machine, raising questions about who controls that access and how widely it is disseminated. Beyond the technical aspects, IOSCO identifies a concerning pattern regarding preparedness.

The report also highlights the challenges of a post-quantum transition that extends beyond initial deployment. This final phase involves removing vulnerable algorithms, retiring legacy systems, ensuring consistency across interconnected systems, and addressing archives still protected by outdated cryptography. Maintaining visibility into cryptographic dependencies requires dynamic, continuously updated mechanisms, as technologies, standards, and architectures evolve. The shift is notable, with the message evolving from describing a risk with inherent uncertainties to urging the immediate commencement of the transition to post-quantum cryptography.

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Ivy Delaney

Ivy Delaney has been working with neural networks and machine learning since the mid-nineties, back when a couple of hidden layers and a long afternoon of training counted as ambitious. She has watched the field go from academic curiosity to the thing quietly running underneath everything, and she brings that long view to quantum computing. For Quantum Zeitgeist she covers the ground where the two fields meet. That means quantum machine learning and the variational algorithms it leans on, and it also means the less glamorous but more interesting story of classical machine learning already doing real work inside quantum machines, decoding error-correcting codes, calibrating noisy hardware and learning the error models that simulators depend on. She writes about the hardware those algorithms have to run on too, and about the post-quantum cryptography scramble that the same hardware has set off. Her stories typically start with the paper, whether that is peer-reviewed work, conference proceedings or an arXiv preprint, with the source linked so you can hold a claim up against the research it came from. She is unimpressed by benchmarks that will not say what they beat, and by demonstrations that only work in the press release.

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