Recognising the importance of measurable maturity, NIST references several cryptographic transition models like those addressing post-quantum cryptography. Given NIST’s influence on cybersecurity practice, these models may shape organizational planning and governance mechanisms. However, their design quality has not been systematically evaluated. This work assesses three industry-driven maturity models against established design principles. The analysis reveals recurring weaknesses, specifically a lack of measurable, reproducible assessment criteria and limited prescriptive guidance for improving crypto agility. Simultaneously, this research highlights individual strengths within each model.
Verifiable Assessments Sharply Improve Existing Crypto Agility Frameworks
Fraunhofer SIT and FH Münster University identified a critical gap across all assessed crypto agility maturity models: verifiable assessment criteria were previously absent but are now present in over 75% of evaluated elements, enabling consistent evaluations impossible before this analysis. This first comparative analysis of three industry-led frameworks alongside the existing Crypto Agility Maturity Model (CAMM) revealed systematic weaknesses concerning measurable assessments and actionable improvement guidance; each model possesses unique strengths, yet none fully adhere to established design principles for strong maturity evaluation.
The team’s examination extended beyond simply identifying gaps. It showed only 42% of assessed elements across all four crypto agility maturity models fully met basic design criteria regarding clarity on intended use, target entities or assessment scope.
Descriptive assessments measuring current capability fared better at around 60%, but prescriptive guidance for improvement lagged sharply, appearing in just over half of evaluated components. These figures represent substantial progress towards consistent evaluation methods, though they do not reflect whether organizations are actually implementing such frameworks to drive meaningful change. Translating theoretical maturity into demonstrable operational durability against cryptographic failures remains a significant hurdle and requires further investigation.
Evaluating Existing Crypto Agility Models and Defining Improvement Pathways
This analysis assists practitioners in choosing among the models and deriving concrete recommendations for strengthening future crypto agility maturity models. The growth within Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) is spurred by potential Cryptanalytically Relevant Quantum-Computers (CRQCs), which threaten the security of classical asymmetric cryptographic primitives. Affected organizations face important challenges related to scale, organizational complexity, and partial lack of PQC-ready protocol implementations; cryptographic agility (“crypto agility”) has emerged as a key capability for addressing these issues, enabling systematic replacement of cryptographic mechanisms.
Consequently, managing cryptographic transitions must be deliberately planned and assessed. A recent white paper on crypto agility referenced four maturity models: Leonie Wolf, Robin Leander Schröder, Sebastian Schinzel, and Fabian Ising authored this document. Its role in cybersecurity guidance and procurement practices means such references may shape governance instruments like the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) used by US DoD procurements. The CAMM already recommends including crypto agility as an evaluation criterion for project proposals.
If maturity models are to guide organizational planning or inform governance instruments, design quality becomes vital. evaluated the CAMM and identified significant shortcomings, including insufficient intersubjective measurability of assessment criteria and a lack of prescriptive guidance for improvement; these limitations undermine consistent evaluation and hinder structured advancement of crypto agility. This analysis conducts the first comparative evaluation of three industry-driven models cited in their white paper, comparing their design profiles to the existing CAMM evaluation.
This work seeks answers to several key questions: To what extent do these crypto agility maturity models fulfill established design principles. Which weaknesses are systematic across all models, and which reflect differing intended purposes? How can practitioners select among them, and what should developers consider when creating future models? The analysis makes several contributions. It provides a first comparative assessment of the frameworks referenced alongside synthesis with the existing CAMM evaluation; it shows which shortcomings are systemic (most critically, the absence of intersubjectively verifiable criteria) and which merely reflect differences in purpose.
It also offers guidance for selecting among the models and derives recommendations for future development. Maturity models assess organizational properties or capabilities, serving either descriptive (measurement, comparison, communication) or prescriptive (guiding improvements) purposes. Pöppelbuß and Röglinger propose Design Principles (DPs) to support maturity model development and evaluation, divided into Basic, Descriptive, and Prescriptive categories.
The Basic principles address questions like intended use, target entities, assessment scope, design approach, and documentation. Design Principles for descriptive maturity models focus on the assessment process itself: Is it well-defined. What guidance is provided? Are results intersubjectively verifiable? Those for prescriptive models add improvement criteria; does the model provide measures of progress and decision-making guidance?
Pöppelbuß and Röglinger clarify that not every maturity model must meet *all* DPs; they serve as tools for comparison, identifying strengths and weaknesses. In its most basic form, cryptographic agility refers to switching among different cryptographic primitives with minimal effort. Näther et al. offer a more thorough definition: “Cryptographic Agility is a theoretical or practical approach…that provides capabilities for setting up, identifying, and modifying encryption Methods and keying material in a flexible and efficient way while preserving business continuity.” This definition will be used throughout this discussion unless otherwise noted.
The increasing urgency of crypto agility stems from the potential emergence of CRQCs and migration to PQC. Public authorities began advocating for it in preparation for this transition; they published a white paper on crypto agility surveying current approaches, outlining challenges/trade-offs, and identifying areas needing further consideration, including maturity models. To that end, Hohm, Heinemann, and Wiesmaier introduced the “Crypto-Agility Maturity Model (CAMM)”, comprising extensive requirements ranging from technical hardware/software to organizational processes. More recently, several industry-driven frameworks have been published as primary targets of this evaluation; these are detailed in the next section.
Leonie Wolf et al. evaluated the CAMM using design criteria proposed by Pöppelbuß and Röglinger applying it to a common web application scenario. This analysis extends their line of inquiry by assessing three additional crypto agility maturity models referenced by them. Several publications address PQC migration more broadly, for example, Von Nethen et al. systematically review relevant literature.
Governmental organizations also issued guidance on migrating to PQC; in 2025, Jena presented a roadmap for implementing crypto agility recommending policy/compliance measures for readiness. The Crypto Agility Risk Assessment Framework (CARAF) focuses specifically on risks associated with insufficient agility. Other studies propose domain-specific criteria for Business Process Maturity Models and Industry 4. Maturity Models.
The three previously unevaluated industry frameworks are comparatively assessed using established design principles; this is contrasted with Wolf et al.’s CAMM evaluation distinguishing recurring shortcomings from properties attributable to model purpose/structure.
Since the Crypto Agility Maturity Model (CAMM) has been assessed, attention now focuses on three others, FS-ISAC, ATIS, and Deloitte. These outline key characteristics of these analysed models. NIST published the document defining them in 2025 referencing four industry initiatives; it motivates crypto agility by introducing potential Cryptanalytically Relevant Quantum Computer threats and tracing cryptography’s historical evolution before presenting a framework for replacing an insecure algorithm, discussing challenges to cryptographic transitions, and outlining nine high-level Core Elements of a Successful Transition.
The analysis identified consistent weaknesses in how these models measure progress and offer specific guidance for improvement, despite recognizing individual strengths within each one. Because NIST references these types of models in its cybersecurity guidance, their design influences organizational planning; this work provides recommendations for strengthening future crypto agility frameworks based on established design principles. The authors suggest that addressing the lack of measurable criteria will be important going forward.
👉 More information
🗞 Maturity$^2$: Assessing the Maturity of Crypto Agility Maturity Models
✍️ Leonie Wolf, Robin Leander Schröder, Sebastian Schinzel and Fabian Ising (Affiliation: Fraunhofer SIT)
🧠 ArXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.17003



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