The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has detailed its official approach to a widespread cryptographic overhaul with the release of NISTIR 8547, a report outlining timelines for migrating away from encryption vulnerable to future quantum computers. Finalized post-quantum cryptography standards arrived in August 2024, prompting this new guidance for federal agencies, industry and standards organizations preparing for a quantum future.

“We understand there’s not one strategy that fits all use cases, and we want to help people handle their migration while staying abreast of what’s changing,” said NIST mathematician Dustin Moody, who heads the PQC standardization project. The report acknowledges that migration timelines will vary, reflecting the complexity of updating systems against the looming threat of “harvest now, decrypt later” attacks.

Quantum-Vulnerable Algorithms and Transition to Post-Quantum Standards

This guidance is important given the looming threat to existing cryptographic standards posed by the potential development of cryptanalytically relevant quantum computers, machines capable of breaking widely used encryption. The report identifies specific algorithms slated for phase-out, providing organizations with the information needed to proactively plan their cryptographic modernization efforts. The agency’s approach recognizes the urgency of the situation, driven by the “harvest now, decrypt later” threat, where adversaries are already collecting encrypted data with the intention of decrypting it once quantum computers become powerful enough.

This risk is a primary motivator for accelerating the transition to post-quantum cryptography, necessitating a well-considered schedule for implementing changes. National Security Memorandum 10 established 2035 as the target for completing the migration across federal systems, while Executive Order 14412 further accelerated this timeline, requiring federal high-value assets to migrate by 2030 for key establishment and 2031 for digital signatures.

NISTIR 8547 directly supports these ambitious timelines, offering a detailed roadmap for achieving them. The complexity of the migration process is a central theme of the report, which emphasizes that organizations must consider their internal systems and their entire cryptographic supply chain. Factors influencing migration speed will vary significantly, meaning a one-size-fits-all solution is impractical. Prioritization of migration efforts is also recommended, with organizations potentially focusing on migrating to the FIPS 203 key establishment standard for particularly sensitive data or information requiring long-term security due to the immediate threat of data interception.

Beyond a complete overhaul, the report acknowledges the viability of a hybrid approach, combining conventional encryption with post-quantum cryptography. This strategy, likened to using two padlocks, offers a more conservative security posture but demands increased computational resources. NIST accommodates this option, recognizing that organizations may prefer a layered defense.

The agency’s guidance also builds upon the work of the National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE), which is focused on demonstrating practical tools and blueprints for implementing the new standards. The report’s contents are intended to complement the NCCoE’s migration to PQC guidelines project, a cross-sector collaboration focused on the use of NIST PQC standards. This project is actively working on demonstrations of cryptographic visibility and risk management practices to prioritize migration to PQC, offering tangible support for organizations during the transition.

“The new report can help you understand the standards and requirements of the migration,” Moody said, “while the NCCoE project can show you the practical tools and blueprints to get the job done.” Understanding the specific allowances and restrictions placed on algorithms is paramount for effective planning, according to the report. “It’s important to know how a given algorithm might be disallowed in federal systems after a certain date, for instance, or whether it will be allowed but at the user’s own risk.

Factors like this can help an organization plan,” Moody explained, highlighting the need for granular detail in the transition process. The report’s release marks a critical step in preparing for a future where current encryption methods are no longer secure, providing the necessary guidance for organizations to navigate the complex field of post-quantum cryptography and safeguard their data.