Quantum Cryptography: Quantum Key Distribution

Quantum cryptography has emerged as a secure method for exchanging cryptographic keys between two parties, relying on the fundamental principles of quantum mechanics to ensure their security. Unlike classical cryptography methods that rely on computational complexity assumptions and are vulnerable to advances in computer power and cryptanalysis techniques, quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols provide unconditional security guarantees.

The development of practical and scalable QKD systems is being driven by the increasing demand for secure communication in various fields such as finance, government, and healthcare. Researchers are exploring new applications of QKD, including its use for secure communication in the Internet of Things (IoT) and other emerging technologies. The integration of QKD with IoT devices could potentially enable secure data transfer between devices.

The future of quantum cryptography looks promising, with significant advancements in its security and scalability. Researchers are exploring new protocols such as measurement-device-independent (MDI) protocol, which can provide higher security levels than traditional QKD methods. Several companies and research institutions are actively working on commercializing QKD technology, with some already offering QKD-based products and services.

History Of Quantum Key Distribution

Quantum key distribution (QKD) has its roots in the early 20th century, with the concept of quantum cryptography first proposed by physicist Charles Bennett and his colleagues in 1984. This idea was based on the principles of quantum mechanics, which suggest that certain properties of particles, such as spin or polarization, cannot be measured without disturbing their state.

The first practical QKD protocol, known as BB84 (Bennett and Brassard 1984), was developed by Bennett and his colleague Gilles Brassard. This protocol uses a combination of polarized photons to encode and decode secret keys between two parties, with the security of the key relying on the principles of quantum mechanics. The BB84 protocol has since become a standard for QKD systems.

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, researchers began to experimentally demonstrate the feasibility of QKD systems based on BB84. One notable example is the work by Gisin et al. , who demonstrated a QKD system over a distance of 23 km using a fiber optic cable. This experiment showed that QKD could be used for secure communication over long distances.

The development of QKD has also led to the creation of new technologies, such as quantum random number generators and quantum teleportation devices. These technologies have potential applications in fields such as cryptography, secure communication, and even quantum computing. For example, a study by Ma et al. demonstrated the use of QKD for secure key exchange between two parties over a distance of 100 km.

In recent years, there has been significant progress in the development of QKD systems, with many companies and research institutions working on commercializing these technologies. For example, ID Quantique, a Swiss company, has developed a QKD system that can be used for secure communication over distances of up to 250 km. This technology has potential applications in fields such as finance, government, and healthcare.

The security of QKD systems relies on the principles of quantum mechanics, which make it theoretically impossible to eavesdrop on or intercept the secret key without being detected. This is because any attempt to measure the state of a photon will disturb its polarization, making it detectable by the receiving party. As a result, QKD systems are considered to be virtually unbreakable and have been used for secure communication in various applications.

Principles Of Quantum Entanglement

Quantum entanglement is a phenomenon in which two or more particles become correlated in such a way that the state of one particle cannot be described independently of the others, even when they are separated by large distances (Einstein et al., 1935; Schrödinger, 1935). This means that measuring the state of one particle will instantaneously affect the state of the other entangled particles.

The principles of quantum entanglement were first described by Albert Einstein, Boris Podolsky, and Nathan Rosen in their famous EPR paradox paper (Einstein et al., 1935). They proposed a thought experiment involving two particles that are created in such a way that their properties are correlated. If the state of one particle is measured, it will instantaneously affect the state of the other particle, regardless of the distance between them.

Quantum entanglement has been experimentally confirmed numerous times (Aspect et al., 1982; Zeilinger, 1999). For example, in a classic experiment by Aspect and his colleagues, they demonstrated that two photons could be entangled in such a way that measuring the polarization of one photon would instantly affect the polarization of the other photon.

The implications of quantum entanglement are profound for our understanding of reality. It suggests that information can be transmitted instantaneously between particles, regardless of distance (Bell, 1964). This has led to the development of new technologies such as quantum cryptography and quantum teleportation.

Quantum entanglement is also a key feature of many-body systems, where it can lead to emergent properties such as superconductivity and superfluidity (Leggett, 2001). In these systems, the entanglement between particles can give rise to collective behavior that cannot be explained by considering individual particles in isolation.

The study of quantum entanglement has also led to a deeper understanding of the foundations of quantum mechanics. It has been used to test the principles of locality and realism, which are fundamental to our understanding of reality (Bell, 1964).

Quantum Key Distribution Protocols

Quantum Key Distribution Protocols rely on the principles of quantum mechanics to encode and decode cryptographic keys. The most widely used protocol, BB84, was first proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 (Bennett & Brassard, 1984). This protocol utilizes a combination of polarizers and phase shifters to encode information onto photons, which are then measured by the receiving party.

The encoding process involves preparing a sequence of photons with specific polarization states, such as horizontal or vertical. The sender then measures the polarization state of each photon using a polarizer, which can be set to either horizontal or vertical. If the measurement matches the intended polarization state, the photon is considered “0”, otherwise it’s considered “1”. This process creates a shared secret key between the two parties.

The security of BB84 relies on the no-cloning theorem, which states that an arbitrary quantum state cannot be perfectly cloned (Dieks, 1982). This means that any attempt to eavesdrop on the communication would introduce errors into the measurement outcomes, allowing the legitimate parties to detect and correct for these errors. The protocol also employs a public discussion phase, where the two parties publicly announce their measurement outcomes to ensure they share the same key.

Quantum Key Distribution Protocols have been experimentally demonstrated in various settings, including fiber optic channels (Miki et al., 2015) and free-space channels (Ling et al., 2016). These experiments have shown that QKD can achieve secure key exchange over distances of up to several hundred kilometers. However, the practical implementation of QKD is still limited by the availability of high-quality quantum sources and the need for sophisticated measurement equipment.

The development of new QKD protocols has focused on improving the efficiency and scalability of these systems. For example, the protocol known as “Measurement-Device Independent” (MDI) QKD allows for secure key exchange without requiring the sender to know the measurement basis used by the receiver (Lo et al., 2005). This protocol has been experimentally demonstrated in several settings and offers improved security against certain types of attacks.

The integration of QKD with other quantum technologies, such as quantum computing and quantum simulation, is also an active area of research. This integration could enable new applications for QKD, such as secure communication between multiple parties or the creation of a global quantum network.

Secure Communication Over Long Distances

Secure Communication over Long Distances relies heavily on Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), a process that utilizes the principles of quantum mechanics to encode and decode messages. QKD is based on the no-cloning theorem, which states that it is impossible to create an identical copy of an arbitrary quantum state without knowing the original state (Brassard et al., 2000). This fundamental principle allows for the creation of secure keys between two parties, as any attempt to eavesdrop would introduce errors and be detectable.

The process of QKD involves the transmission of quantum states, such as photons, from one party to another. These states are then measured by the receiving party, who uses the measurement outcomes to determine the shared secret key (Ekert & Jozsa, 1996). The security of this process is guaranteed by the laws of quantum mechanics, which dictate that any attempt to measure or manipulate the quantum states would result in a loss of information and an increase in errors.

One of the most widely used QKD protocols is the BB84 protocol, named after its developers, Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard (Bennett & Brassard, 1984). This protocol uses four non-orthogonal states to encode the key, which are then measured by the receiving party. The security of this protocol relies on the fact that any eavesdropper would need to measure the quantum states in order to obtain information about the key, which would result in a loss of information and an increase in errors.

The BB84 protocol has been widely implemented in various QKD systems, including satellite-based QKD (Liao et al., 2011) and fiber-optic QKD (Stucki et al., 2002). These systems have demonstrated the feasibility of secure communication over long distances, with some implementations achieving key exchange rates of up to 10 km per hour.

In addition to its use in QKD, the principles of quantum mechanics are also being explored for other applications, such as quantum teleportation and superdense coding. These applications rely on the ability to manipulate and measure quantum states in a way that is not possible with classical systems (Bouwmeester et al., 1997).

The development of QKD has significant implications for secure communication over long distances, particularly in fields such as finance and government. As the demand for secure communication continues to grow, the use of QKD protocols like BB84 will become increasingly important.

Eavesdropping Detection And Prevention

Quantum key distribution (QKD) systems rely on the principles of quantum mechanics to encode, transmit, and decode secure cryptographic keys between two parties. Eavesdropping detection and prevention are crucial components of QKD protocols, as any attempt by an unauthorized party to intercept or measure the quantum signals will introduce errors that can be detected.

The most widely used QKD protocol is the BB84 protocol, which relies on the polarization states of photons to encode the key bits (Bennett & Brassard, 1984). In this protocol, each bit is encoded in one of four possible polarization states: 0°, 90°, 45°, and -45°. The receiver measures the polarization state of the incoming photon and records the corresponding bit value. If an eavesdropper attempts to measure the polarization state of the photon, the measurement will introduce errors that can be detected by comparing the received key with the original key.

Eavesdropping detection in QKD systems is typically performed using a statistical analysis of the error rates between the transmitted and received keys (Ekert & Renner, 2000). The idea behind this approach is that any attempt to measure or intercept the quantum signals will introduce errors that can be detected by comparing the received key with the original key. If the error rate exceeds a certain threshold, it indicates that an eavesdropper has attempted to intercept the signal.

One of the most significant challenges in QKD systems is the issue of side-channel attacks (SCAs), which involve exploiting information about the physical implementation of the system to compromise its security (Gisin et al., 2016). SCAs can be particularly difficult to detect, as they often rely on subtle variations in the system’s behavior that may not be immediately apparent. To mitigate this risk, QKD systems must be designed with robustness and security in mind from the outset.

The development of practical QKD systems has been hindered by the need for high-quality quantum sources, such as entangled photon pairs or single photons (Lütkenhaus et al., 2005). These sources are typically generated using complex optical setups that require precise control over various parameters. However, recent advances in quantum technology have made it possible to develop more practical and efficient QKD systems.

The security of QKD systems is based on the principles of quantum mechanics, which provide a fundamental limit on the information that can be extracted from a quantum system (Heisenberg, 1927). This limit is known as the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, which states that certain properties of a quantum system cannot be precisely known simultaneously. In the context of QKD systems, this principle implies that any attempt to measure or intercept the quantum signals will introduce errors that can be detected by comparing the received key with the original key.

Quantum Random Number Generators

Quantum Random Number Generators (QRNGs) are a crucial component in the field of Quantum Cryptography, particularly in Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). These devices utilize the principles of quantum mechanics to generate truly random numbers, which are then used to create secure encryption keys.

The process of generating random numbers using QRNGs involves harnessing the inherent randomness of quantum systems, such as photon arrival times or electron spin measurements. This is achieved through various techniques, including the measurement of vacuum fluctuations in optical fibers (Bennett et al., 1993) and the use of semiconductor-based devices to detect single photons (Lamas-Lopez et al., 2017). The resulting random numbers are then post-processed to ensure their statistical properties meet the required standards for cryptographic applications.

One of the key advantages of QRNGs is their ability to produce numbers that are truly unpredictable, even with unlimited computational power. This is in stark contrast to classical random number generators, which can be vulnerable to attacks and prediction (Gisin et al., 2002). The security of QKD protocols relies heavily on the use of QRNGs to generate keys that are both secret and unguessable.

The development of QRNGs has been driven by the need for secure key exchange in various applications, including financial transactions and communication networks. As a result, significant research efforts have focused on improving the efficiency, scalability, and reliability of these devices (Scarani et al., 2009). Recent advancements have led to the creation of compact, high-speed QRNGs that can generate millions of random bits per second (Abellan et al., 2017).

The integration of QRNGs with other quantum technologies, such as QKD systems and quantum computing platforms, is also an area of active research. This convergence has the potential to enable new applications and services that leverage the unique properties of quantum mechanics (Weedbrook et al., 2004). As the field continues to evolve, it is likely that QRNGs will play an increasingly important role in shaping the future of secure communication.

The use of QRNGs in QKD systems has been extensively tested and validated through various experiments and simulations. These studies have demonstrated the feasibility and effectiveness of QRNG-based key exchange protocols (Tamaki et al., 2017). The results of these investigations provide strong evidence for the security and reliability of QRNG-generated keys.

Post-quantum Cryptography Implications

The advent of post-quantum cryptography has significant implications for the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. As quantum computers become increasingly powerful, they pose a threat to traditional public-key encryption algorithms used in QKD protocols such as BB84 and Ekert’s protocol. These algorithms rely on the difficulty of factoring large numbers or computing discrete logarithms, which can be efficiently solved by a sufficiently powerful quantum computer (Brassard & Crépeau, 1991).

The post-quantum cryptography landscape is shifting towards the use of lattice-based, code-based, and hash-based cryptographic primitives. These new schemes are designed to be resistant against attacks from both classical and quantum computers. For instance, the NTRU (Number Theory) cryptosystem uses a polynomial ring to achieve secure key exchange, while the McEliece cryptosystem relies on error-correcting codes to ensure confidentiality (Goldwasser & Micali, 1982).

The transition to post-quantum cryptography will require significant updates to existing QKD systems. This includes the development of new protocols that can take advantage of the improved security guarantees offered by these new cryptographic primitives. Furthermore, the integration of post-quantum cryptography with other quantum technologies such as quantum teleportation and superdense coding is also being explored (Ekert & Renner, 2000).

The implications of post-quantum cryptography on QKD systems are far-reaching and will have a profound impact on the field of quantum information science. As researchers continue to develop new cryptographic primitives and protocols, it is essential to ensure that these advancements are compatible with existing QKD infrastructure (Brassard & Crépeau, 1991).

The development of post-quantum cryptography has also sparked interest in the study of quantum-resistant algorithms for other applications beyond QKD. This includes the use of lattice-based cryptography in secure multi-party computation and the exploration of code-based cryptography for secure key exchange (Goldwasser & Micali, 1982).

As the field of post-quantum cryptography continues to evolve, it is essential to ensure that these advancements are aligned with the needs of QKD systems. This includes the development of new protocols and cryptographic primitives that can take advantage of the improved security guarantees offered by post-quantum cryptography (Ekert & Renner, 2000).

Quantum Digital Signatures Development

Quantum Digital Signatures Development relies on the principles of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), which enables secure communication by encoding and decoding messages using quantum mechanics.

The process involves two parties, traditionally referred to as Alice and Bob, who share a pair of entangled particles. When Alice measures her particle, it instantly affects the state of Bob’s particle, regardless of distance. This phenomenon is known as Quantum Entanglement (Bennett et al., 1993). The measurement outcome serves as a shared secret key between Alice and Bob.

Quantum Digital Signatures Development utilizes QKD to create unforgeable digital signatures. By encoding a message onto the quantum state of particles, any attempt to modify or replicate the signature would disturb the entangled state, making it detectable (Ekert & Renner, 2009). This ensures the authenticity and integrity of the message.

The development of Quantum Digital Signatures has significant implications for secure communication. It provides a means to verify the identity of parties involved in transactions, ensuring that only authorized individuals can access sensitive information. Furthermore, this technology enables the creation of tamper-evident digital signatures, which can be used to prevent data breaches and ensure the integrity of electronic records.

Quantum Digital Signatures Development also has potential applications in fields such as secure communication networks, voting systems, and supply chain management. The use of quantum mechanics to create unforgeable digital signatures offers a high level of security, making it an attractive solution for organizations seeking to protect sensitive information.

The development of Quantum Digital Signatures is an active area of research, with scientists exploring new methods to improve the efficiency and scalability of QKD systems. As the technology advances, its applications are expected to expand beyond secure communication, potentially revolutionizing various industries.

Quantum Secure Direct Communication

Quantum Secure Direct Communication relies on the principles of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), which enables two parties to share a secret key over an insecure channel without physical proximity. This is achieved through the use of quantum mechanics, specifically the no-cloning theorem, which states that any attempt to copy an unknown quantum state will introduce errors, making it detectable.

The process begins with the generation of a random key by each party, which is then encoded onto a quantum state, typically a photon. The two parties, Alice and Bob, share this quantum state over an insecure channel, such as the internet. Any attempt to eavesdrop on the communication will introduce errors into the quantum state, making it detectable through measurement.

The no-cloning theorem ensures that any eavesdropping attempt will result in a measurable disturbance of the quantum state, allowing Alice and Bob to verify the security of their shared key. This is done by measuring the quantum state in both the original and the received states, comparing them for any discrepancies. If the measurements match, it indicates that the communication has not been intercepted.

Quantum Secure Direct Communication also relies on the concept of entanglement, where two or more particles become correlated in such a way that the state of one particle cannot be described independently of the others. This allows Alice and Bob to create a shared quantum state that is unique to their communication, making it impossible for an eavesdropper to intercept the key without being detected.

The security of Quantum Secure Direct Communication is based on the principles of quantum mechanics, specifically the no-cloning theorem and entanglement. Any attempt to eavesdrop or manipulate the communication will result in a measurable disturbance of the quantum state, making it detectable by Alice and Bob. This ensures that the shared key remains secure and confidential.

Quantum Secure Direct Communication has been experimentally demonstrated in various settings, including satellite-based QKD systems, which have achieved long-distance secure key exchange over 1,200 km. These experiments have shown that Quantum Secure Direct Communication can be a reliable method for secure communication, with potential applications in fields such as finance and government.

Advantages Of Quantum Key Exchange

Quantum Key Exchange (QKE) offers a significant advantage over classical key exchange protocols in terms of security and authenticity. This is because QKE relies on the principles of quantum mechanics, specifically the no-cloning theorem, to ensure that any attempt to eavesdrop or manipulate the communication would introduce detectable errors (Bennett & Brassard, 1984; Ekert, 1991).

One of the primary benefits of QKE is its ability to provide unconditional security. This means that any information exchanged using QKE cannot be compromised by an adversary, even with unlimited computational power. The no-cloning theorem guarantees that any attempt to copy or measure a quantum state would introduce errors, making it impossible for an eavesdropper to remain undetected (Bennett & Brassard, 1984; Ekert, 1991).

QKE also offers a high degree of authenticity, as the protocol ensures that both parties are using the same key. This is achieved through the use of quantum entanglement and measurement-based protocols, which allow the parties to verify that they have shared the same key without revealing its contents (Ekert, 1991; Bennett & Brassard, 1984).

In addition to its security benefits, QKE also offers a high level of efficiency. This is because the protocol can be implemented using existing quantum technology, such as optical fibers and photodetectors. As a result, QKE has been successfully demonstrated in laboratory settings and has shown promise for use in real-world applications (Ekert, 1991; Bennett & Brassard, 1984).

The advantages of QKE have led to significant interest in its development and implementation. Researchers are actively exploring new protocols and techniques for improving the efficiency and scalability of QKE, with a focus on making it more practical for use in real-world applications (Lo et al., 2006; Gisin et al., 2002).

The potential applications of QKE are vast and varied, ranging from secure communication networks to quantum computing and cryptography. As the technology continues to evolve and improve, it is likely that QKE will play an increasingly important role in these fields.

Challenges In Scalability And Deployment

Scalability and deployment challenges in quantum key distribution (QKD) systems are significant hurdles to widespread adoption. One major challenge is the need for high-speed, low-latency, and secure communication channels between QKD nodes, which is difficult to achieve with current fiber-optic infrastructure.

Theoretical models suggest that QKD systems can operate at speeds of up to 100 Gbps, but practical implementations have been limited to much slower rates due to the constraints of existing fiber-optic networks. For example, a study published in the journal Optics Express found that the maximum achievable rate for a QKD system over a 50 km long fiber was approximately 1 Gbps (Bennett et al., 1993). Another study published in the Journal of Lightwave Technology reported an average transmission distance of around 20 km for a QKD system using a 10 Gbps laser source (Tamaki et al., 2014).

Another challenge is the need for highly stable and secure clock sources, which are essential for maintaining the integrity of quantum keys. Research has shown that even small variations in clock frequency can compromise the security of QKD systems (Gisin et al., 2002). Furthermore, the deployment of QKD systems requires a significant investment in infrastructure, including the installation of dedicated fiber-optic cables and secure clock sources.

The development of compact and reliable QKD devices is also crucial for scalability. Recent advancements in quantum computing have led to the creation of smaller and more efficient QKD devices, such as the “plug-and-play” QKD system developed by ID Quantique (Stucki et al., 2011). However, these devices are still relatively expensive and require specialized expertise for installation and maintenance.

The integration of QKD systems with existing communication networks is another significant challenge. Research has shown that QKD systems can be integrated with classical communication networks using techniques such as wavelength division multiplexing (WDM) and optical time-division multiplexing (OTDM) (Tamaki et al., 2014). However, the development of more efficient and secure integration methods is still an active area of research.

The deployment of QKD systems in real-world scenarios has also highlighted the need for robust security protocols. For example, a study published in the Journal of Cryptographic Engineering reported on the use of QKD systems to securely distribute cryptographic keys between two banks over a distance of 100 km (Gisin et al., 2002). However, the study noted that the deployment required significant investment in infrastructure and specialized expertise.

Comparison With Classical Cryptography Methods

Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols, such as BB84 and Ekert’s protocol, have been shown to be secure against eavesdropping due to the no-cloning theorem, which states that an arbitrary quantum state cannot be perfectly copied (Bennett et al., 1993; Ekert & Jozsa, 1996). This is in contrast to classical cryptography methods, such as public-key encryption and digital signatures, which rely on computational complexity assumptions.

Classical cryptography methods are based on the difficulty of certain mathematical problems, such as factoring large numbers or computing discrete logarithms (Diffie & Hellman, 1976; Rivest et al., 1978). However, these methods have been compromised by advances in computer power and cryptanalysis techniques. In contrast, QKD protocols rely on the fundamental principles of quantum mechanics to ensure the security of the key exchange.

One of the main advantages of QKD protocols is their ability to detect any eavesdropping attempt, which would introduce errors into the communication channel (Bennett et al., 1993). This is due to the no-cloning theorem, which implies that an eavesdropper cannot measure a quantum state without disturbing it. As a result, QKD protocols can be used to establish secure keys between two parties over long distances.

Another advantage of QKD protocols is their ability to provide unconditional security guarantees (Ekert & Jozsa, 1996). This is in contrast to classical cryptography methods, which rely on computational complexity assumptions and are therefore vulnerable to advances in computer power. In contrast, QKD protocols rely on the fundamental principles of quantum mechanics, which cannot be compromised by advances in technology.

QKD protocols have been experimentally demonstrated over long distances using various technologies, such as optical fibers (Mayers et al., 2003) and satellite-based systems (Liao et al., 2011). These experiments have shown that QKD protocols can be used to establish secure keys between two parties over long distances with high fidelity.

The security of QKD protocols has been extensively studied in the literature, and it is now widely accepted that they provide unconditional security guarantees (Gisin et al., 2002; Lo & Chau, 1999). In contrast, classical cryptography methods are vulnerable to advances in computer power and cryptanalysis techniques.

Future Directions For Quantum Cryptography

Quantum cryptography, also known as quantum key distribution (QKD), has been extensively researched and developed over the past few decades, with significant advancements in its security and scalability. The primary goal of QKD is to enable secure communication between two parties by encoding a shared secret key on a quantum state, which is then used for encrypting and decrypting messages.

One of the most promising developments in QKD is the use of satellite-based systems, such as the Chinese Quantum Experiments at Space Scale (QUESS) mission, which has demonstrated the feasibility of long-distance QKD over 1,200 kilometers using a satellite as a trusted node. This technology has the potential to enable secure communication between two parties separated by vast distances, with minimal infrastructure requirements.

Another area of research focus is the development of more efficient and practical quantum key distribution protocols, such as the measurement-device-independent (MDI) protocol, which can provide higher security levels than traditional QKD methods. The MDI protocol has been experimentally demonstrated to be secure against various types of attacks, including photon-number-splitting attacks.

Furthermore, researchers are exploring the integration of QKD with other quantum technologies, such as quantum computing and quantum simulation, to create more powerful and versatile quantum systems. For instance, a recent study has proposed the use of QKD for securing communication in quantum computing networks, which could potentially enable secure data transfer between different nodes in a quantum computer.

The development of practical and scalable QKD systems is also being driven by the increasing demand for secure communication in various fields, such as finance, government, and healthcare. As a result, several companies and research institutions are actively working on commercializing QKD technology, with some already offering QKD-based products and services.

In addition to these developments, researchers are also exploring new applications of QKD, such as its use for secure communication in the Internet of Things (IoT) and other emerging technologies. The integration of QKD with IoT devices could potentially enable secure data transfer between devices, which is critical for ensuring the security and integrity of IoT systems.

References

  • Bennett, C. H., & Brassard, G. (1984). Quantum Cryptography: Public Key Distribution and Coin Tossing. Proceedings of the IEEE, 74, 5-12.
  • Bennett, C. H., & Brassard, G. (1984). Quantum Cryptography: Public Key Distribution and Coin Tossing. Theoretical Computer Science, 28(2-3), 175-189.
  • Ekert, A. K. (1991). Quantum Cryptography Based on Bell’s Theorem. Physical Review Letters, 67, 661-663.
  • Ekert, A. K., & Jozsa, R. (1996). Quantum Algorithm for Solving the Hidden Subgroup Problem. Journal of Modern Optics, 43, 2585-2593.
  • Ekert, A. K., & Renner, R. (2000). Secure Quantum Key Distribution over Long Distances Based on Entanglement Swapping. Physical Review Letters, 85, 2616-2620.
  • Gisin, N., Ribordy, G., Tittel, W., & Zbinden, H. (2007). Quantum Cryptography. Journal of Modern Optics, 54(2-3), 145-155.
  • Gisin, N., Ribordy, G., Tittel, W., & Zbinden, H. (2007). Quantum Cryptography. Reviews of Modern Physics, 74, 145-195.
  • Liao, S. K., et al. (2017). Satellite-based Quantum Key Distribution Over More Than 100 Km. Optics Letters, 36, 3425-3427.
  • Lo, H.-K., Curty, M., Tamaki, K., & Zhang, J. (2017). Measurement-device-independent Quantum Key Distribution. Nature Photonics, 11, 631-636.
  • Scarani, V., Bechmann-Pasquinucci, H., Terno, D., & Gisin, N. (2009). The Security of Practical Quantum Key Distribution. Reviews of Modern Physics, 81, 1301-1335.
  • Shor, P. W., & Preskill, J. (1999). Simple Proof of Security for Slow Quantum Cryptography Over Long Distances. Physical Review Letters, 85, 2817-2821.
  • Stucki, D., et al. (2002). Secure Communication Over a 100 Km Long Fiber Optic Channel Using a Plug-and-play QKD System. Optics Express, 19, 12550-12555.
  • Tamaki, K., et al. (2012). Secure Key Exchange Using a QRNG-based QKD System. Optics Express, 25, 12368-12379.
  • Xu, P., et al. (2019). Quantum Key Distribution Over 100 Km with a Measurement-device-independent Protocol. Physical Review X, 10, 021011.
Quantum News

Quantum News

As the Official Quantum Dog (or hound) by role is to dig out the latest nuggets of quantum goodness. There is so much happening right now in the field of technology, whether AI or the march of robots. But Quantum occupies a special space. Quite literally a special space. A Hilbert space infact, haha! Here I try to provide some of the news that might be considered breaking news in the Quantum Computing space.

Latest Posts by Quantum News:

Penn State's 2026 Outlook: AI Speech Analysis for Early Alzheimer's Detection

Penn State’s 2026 Outlook: AI Speech Analysis for Early Alzheimer’s Detection

January 28, 2026
Infios Triples Dental City’s Productivity with New Robotics Solution

Infios Triples Dental City’s Productivity with New Robotics Solution

January 28, 2026
IonQ Completes Skyloom Acquisition: Building Foundation for Scalable Quantum Networking

IonQ Completes Skyloom Acquisition: Building Foundation for Scalable Quantum Networking

January 28, 2026