Logic’s Realism Questioned: Contingency, Not Necessity, Drives Current Assumptions

The relationship between scientific realism – the view that scientific theories aim to provide a true description of the world – and the philosophical position of anti-exceptionalism regarding logic is currently under scrutiny. Anti-exceptionalism posits that logic is not fundamentally different from other empirical sciences. Jonas R. B. Arenhart, from the Department of Philosophy, Raoni Arroyo, also from the Department of Philosophy, and colleagues present a detailed analysis suggesting the coupling of these two positions may stem from historical circumstance rather than logical necessity. Their work, entitled ‘Disentangling scientific realism from anti-exceptionalism’, explores the realist assumptions underpinning anti-exceptionalism and considers the viability of adopting an antirealist perspective as an alternative foundation for understanding scientific practice.

The Evolving Landscape of Logic and its Relationship to Scientific Practice

The study of logic acknowledges a multiplicity of formal systems, each offering a distinct framework for determining valid inference and establishing criteria for what logically follows from given premises. These systems, expressed mathematically through semantic or proof-theoretic approaches, differ significantly, presenting a challenge when addressing problems requiring logical tools, particularly when evaluating inferences drawn from natural language. Consequently, philosophers debate which system best captures the informal, extra-systematic notion of logical consequence, influencing how we understand reasoning and inference. Several logics, including paraconsistent, intuitionistic, paracomplete, quantum, and classical logic, have been proposed as candidates, each with its own rules of implication and potential repercussions for evaluating propositions. Traditional epistemology of logic, relying on a priori methods like rational intuition or the semantics of logical vocabulary, is increasingly seen as inadequate for addressing this complex landscape, struggling to account for the revisable nature of logic and the evolving understanding of validity. This perceived deficiency has led to a lack of a satisfactory epistemology within the discipline itself, prompting a search for alternative approaches.

A recent trend, termed anti-exceptionalism about logic (AEL), attempts to bridge this gap by aligning logical knowledge more closely with the knowledge found in empirical sciences, suggesting that logic is not fundamentally distinct from other areas of inquiry. AEL posits that logical principles can be evaluated and revised based on evidence, challenging the traditional view of logic as a purely a priori discipline and opening new avenues for exploring the foundations of logic. This approach allows for a more nuanced understanding of how logical systems are developed, adopted, and revised within different scientific contexts. Scientific realism currently underpins many versions of AEL, assuming the existence of mind-independent facts that logical theories aim to capture, but this reliance on realism is not necessarily inherent to AEL. Alternative perspectives, such as antirealism, could also be accommodated, making the exploration of the relationship between realism and AEL crucial for a comprehensive understanding of the field.

The prevailing view of anti-exceptionalism about logic frequently rests upon a foundation of scientific realism, a philosophical stance asserting the objective existence of the entities posited by successful scientific theories, but recent scholarship challenges this assumed connection. Researchers are actively dissecting the realist underpinnings of anti-exceptionalism, illuminating how this particular philosophical alignment arose and demonstrating the viability of alternative perspectives, not rejecting anti-exceptionalism itself. This investigation questions the necessity of pairing anti-exceptionalism with a realist worldview, acknowledging that logical systems are tools developed to suit specific scientific practices rather than reflecting a single, universally true logic. The methodological approach involves a careful examination of the arguments typically used to support the realist interpretation within anti-exceptionalism, drawing parallels with established debates in the metaphysics of science. Researchers scrutinise how proponents of this view establish a link between the success of scientific theories and the presumed existence of the entities those theories describe, applying analytical tools similar to those used in debates concerning the ontological status of theoretical entities like electrons or gravitational waves. The core of this analysis lies in identifying the inferential steps taken to move from empirical adequacy – the ability of a theory to accurately predict and explain phenomena – to ontological commitment – the assertion that the theory’s postulated entities are real.

A key aspect of this methodological innovation is the explicit consideration of antirealism as a viable alternative background assumption, challenging the claim that the success of scientific theories provides evidence for the existence of unobservable entities. Researchers explore how an antirealist framework might reshape the arguments for anti-exceptionalism, potentially strengthening the case for viewing logical systems as instruments for scientific practice rather than mirrors of objective reality. This involves considering how different interpretations of scientific success – for example, focusing on predictive power rather than representational accuracy – might lead to different conclusions about the relationship between logic and science. The implications of this methodological shift are significant, allowing for a more nuanced understanding of how logical systems are developed, adopted, and revised within different scientific contexts. Furthermore, it challenges the prevailing assumption that a single, objective logic is necessary for scientific progress, suggesting that a plurality of logical systems may be equally valid and effective for different scientific purposes, encouraging a more pragmatic and instrumental view of logic.

This work demonstrates that the prevailing connection between anti-exceptionalism about logic and scientific realism is not a logical requirement, but rather a consequence of current philosophical trends, highlighting this as a contingent connection rooted in sociological factors within the field. The authors successfully challenge the assumption that anti-exceptionalism necessarily relies on a realist worldview, drawing analogies with established debates in the metaphysics of science, particularly concerning the interpretation of physical theories. This effectively illuminates the realist commitments inherent within certain anti-exceptionalist arguments, exposing the underlying assumptions. The research actively dismantles the perceived necessity of realism for anti-exceptionalism by exposing the underlying assumptions, positing that adopting an antirealist stance towards science does not inherently undermine the core tenets of anti-exceptionalism. This is achieved through a careful examination of how realist interpretations shape the arguments for anti-exceptionalism, revealing that alternative, antirealist interpretations remain viable, demonstrating that antirealism, as a default view of science, does not preclude the acceptance of logical pluralism.

The study effectively argues that the choice between realism and antirealism functions as a background assumption, influencing the formulation of anti-exceptionalist arguments rather than being logically entailed by them, opening the possibility of constructing anti-exceptionalist frameworks grounded in alternative metaphysical perspectives. Further research should investigate the specific implications of adopting an antirealist framework for anti-exceptionalism, exploring how this shift affects the interpretation of logical systems and their application to scientific theories. A detailed examination of the consequences for understanding scientific progress and theory change under an antirealist, anti-exceptionalist perspective would be particularly valuable, as would a comparative analysis of different antirealist positions, assessing their compatibility with various forms of anti-exceptionalism. Investigating the potential for integrating insights from constructive empiricism or other antirealist philosophies of science into anti-exceptionalist frameworks would further enrich the debate, providing a valuable test of the framework’s viability and relevance. Finally, exploring the practical consequences of adopting an antirealist, anti-exceptionalist stance for scientific practice, such as the development of new scientific models or the interpretation of experimental results, would provide a valuable test of the framework’s viability and relevance.