Post-Quantum Cryptography Hardware Can Be Compromised

As post-quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithms become more complex, there is a growing demand to accelerate them in hardware. However, this acceleration can also introduce new vulnerabilities. In fact, PQC hardware accelerators can be backdoored by malicious actors located in the chip supply chain, allowing them to access sensitive information and compromise the security of the system.

To combat this threat, researchers propose a sophisticated reverse engineering algorithm called REPQC, which can confidently identify hashing operations within the PQC accelerator. This algorithm allows adversaries to insert malicious logic into the accelerator, increasing its layout density by as little as 0.01 without impacting performance or power consumption.

The findings of this paper have significant implications for PQC hardware accelerators, demonstrating that they can be backdoored and compromising their security and integrity. Therefore, it is essential to develop new algorithms and techniques that can detect and prevent such attacks.

Can Post-Quantum Cryptography Hardware Accelerators Be Trusted?

Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is a rapidly growing field, driven by the need for quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms. As PQC algorithms become more complex, there is a growing demand to accelerate them in hardware. However, this acceleration can also introduce new vulnerabilities. In this article, we explore the possibility of backdooring PQC hardware accelerators and propose a sophisticated reverse engineering algorithm called REPQC.

Backdooring PQC Hardware Accelerators

The motivation for designing quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms is clear: once robust quantum computers become available, current cryptographic standards will be vulnerable. Therefore, it is essential to develop new PQC algorithms that can withstand the threat of quantum attacks. However, due to the inherent complexity of these algorithms, there is also a demand to accelerate them in hardware.

In this paper, we show that PQC hardware accelerators can be backdoored by two different adversaries located in the chip supply chain. These adversaries can insert malicious logic into the accelerator, allowing them to access sensitive information and compromise the security of the system.

REPQC: A Sophisticated Reverse Engineering Algorithm

To combat this threat, we propose a sophisticated reverse engineering algorithm called REPQC. This algorithm is designed to confidently identify hashing operations, such as Keccak, within the PQC accelerator. The location of these hashing operations serves as an anchor for finding secret information that can be leaked.

Armed with REPQC, an adversary can proceed to insert malicious logic in the form of a stealthy Hardware Trojan Horse (HTH). Using Dilithium as a study case, our results demonstrate that HTHs that increase the accelerator’s layout density by as little as 0.01 can be inserted without any impact on the performance of the circuit and with a marginal increase in power consumption.

An essential aspect of REPQC is its automation. This allows adversaries to explore multiple HTH designs and identify the most suitable one, making it easier for them to compromise the security of the system.

Implications for PQC Hardware Accelerators

The findings of this paper have significant implications for PQC hardware accelerators. They demonstrate that these accelerators can be backdoored by malicious actors, compromising their security and integrity. Therefore, it is essential to develop new algorithms and techniques that can detect and prevent such attacks.

Future research directions include developing more sophisticated reverse engineering algorithms like REPQC, exploring the use of machine learning for detecting HTHs, and investigating the feasibility of using PQC hardware accelerators in real-world applications.

Can We Trust Post-Quantum Cryptography Hardware Accelerators?

The answer to this question is a resounding “no.” The findings of this paper demonstrate that PQC hardware accelerators can be backdoored by malicious actors, compromising their security and integrity. Therefore, it is essential to develop new algorithms and techniques that can detect and prevent such attacks.

In conclusion, developing PQC hardware accelerators is a rapidly growing field, driven by the need for quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms. However, this acceleration can also introduce new vulnerabilities. The findings of this paper demonstrate that PQC hardware accelerators can be backdoored by malicious actors, compromising their security and integrity. Therefore, it is essential to develop new algorithms and techniques that can detect and prevent such attacks.